



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
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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
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DIA and DOS review(s) completed.



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\*India-Pakistan: [REDACTED]

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No break in the Indo-Pakistani dispute appears near.

A high Indian foreign affairs official, C. S. Jha, publicly has called the UN cease-fire resolution of 1948--under which the 1949 Kashmir cease-fire line was established--"obsolete and inoperative." According to the Indian government-controlled radio, Jha's statement means that a new cease-fire agreement has to be drawn up and a new cease-fire line demarcated.

[Another Indian official indicated privately to the New Delhi Embassy that troop withdrawals could be worked out, but the plan involves a border readjustment as much as troop withdrawal. These statements are further indications that India does not intend to relinquish its recently-acquired territory and will argue for a readjustment based on its gains.]

[In Pakistan [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
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opposition is critical of Ayub both for engaging in a war with India, and for not winning it.]

Radio Peking has announced that Premier Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi cordially talked today with a Pakistani "friendship delegation" led by Ghulam Faruque, minister of commerce, and including Air Marshal Asghar Khan, head of Pakistan International Airlines. Ghulam Faruque was recently appointed defense advisor to President Ayub in addition to his commerce portfolio.

The Pakistani delegation's primary purpose may be to represent Pakistan at anniversary celebrations of the Chinese Communist regime and to discuss commerce and civil air matters. Defense discussions may also be held, particularly in view of Chen Yi's pledge yesterday of full moral, political, and material support for Pakistan.

(continued)

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There has been no further word on the Indian ultimatum allegedly demanding that Pakistani troops withdraw from the Chhamb sector by 1430 hours local time (5:00 AM EDT) on 30 September or face an attack.

Inside Kashmir, Pakistani infiltrators are said to be burning villages, houses and bridges. About 1,000 guerrillas are reported to have slipped back into Pakistani-held territory while 3,000 still remain in Indian-held Kashmir.

The only fighting of any consequence in the last 24 hours has been reported from the Rajasthan front, about 400 miles south of Lahore. A battalion-sized battle, which began on Tuesday, may still be in progress. The Indian press on 30 September headlined 42 serious Pakistani cease-fire violations, 22 of them in the Rajasthan sector. Most of the violations consisted of small arms and mortar fire.

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\*Indonesia: "A power move which may have far-reaching implications is under way in Djakarta.

A group which calls itself the "30 September Movement" claims to have forestalled a "generals' coup" in Indonesia. A number of unnamed generals and politicians have been arrested, and the homes of Defense Minister General Nasution and Army Commander General Yani are under guard.

A decree issued on 1 October by Lt. Colonel Untung, commander of the presidential bodyguard, stated that the government would be administered by an Indonesian Revolution Council. According to the decree, the council will follow already established government policies, and council membership will be announced shortly.

No mention has been made of any active role by Sukarno. The government radio initially announced that the 30 September movement was organized to "save President Sukarno whose health was in danger." It later commented that he was safe and "continues to carry out the leadership of the state."

The 30 September Group claims that the alleged generals' plot was American inspired. The US Embassy's external telephone line was cut three hours before the Indonesian Radio announced that the "coup" had been thwarted. Troops are stationed at the Embassy.

The immediate purpose of the 30 September movement appears to be the elimination of any political role by anti-Communist army elements and a change in army leadership. Action against similar army elements apparently is also planned outside Djakarta. The affair may also be used to generate new anti-American activity.

It seems likely that Sukarno knew in advance of the movement and its intention. Prime movers in the whole affair, however, in terms of timing and detailed planning may well have been First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio and Communist leaders who are close to him and to Sukarno.

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Communist China: Foreign Minister Chen Yi's statements during his four-hour press conference in Peking on 29 September were so violent and truculent as to suggest that Peking feels on the defensive concerning several aspects of its foreign policy.

There are indications that a high-level party meeting has been going on in Peking, and Chen Yi's remarks probably mirror decisions among top party leaders. Top-level meetings usually review domestic as well as foreign policy, but any current meeting probably would concentrate on outstanding foreign policy problems, such as developments in Vietnam, China's role in the Kashmir crisis, Sino-Soviet relations, and the receding prospects for a Chinese-dominated Afro-Asian conference this November.

An official text has not yet been issued by NCNA. According to foreign press reports, however, Chen Yi lashed out at the frustrations that flow from these problems. In an apparent attempt to refurbish an image of a resolute China--dimmed by Peking's failure to follow through publicly on its commitments to North Vietnam--Chen declared that China was ready for an invasion by the US and its henchmen, including the Soviet Union. He asserted that the war in Vietnam was going well for the Viet Cong and reiterated Peking's hard line on negotiations. Chen promised moral, political, and material assistance for Pakistan if the conflict with India were continued, raised China's stated price for accepting a seat in the UN, and issued a virtual ultimatum demanding agreement to Peking's conditions for the second Afro-Asian conference scheduled to open in Algiers on 5 November.


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Chen's press conference, touching on an unusually wide range of policy issues, strengthens other indications that a top-level meeting was recently held in Peking.

On 27 and 28 September several important regional party leaders appeared in the capital. These men rarely show up except for "enlarged politburo meetings." Such gatherings are normally unannounced and are attended by politburo members, regional and provincial first secretaries, and heads of key central committee departments. The appearance of several regional leaders in Peking is especially suggestive since they normally officiate over 1 October National Day ceremonies in their own bailiwicks.

This is the first indication of a top party gathering in Peking in 1965. The last announced top-level meeting was a special "work conference of the central committee" in June 1964, which apparently considered a broad range of domestic and foreign policy problems. The last formal and publicized meeting of the central committee was the 10th plenum in September 1962, but there were signs of unannounced party meetings in 1963 and in September and December 1964.



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\*Dominican Republic: [The threat of a Communist terrorist campaign adds to an already tense situation.

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the goal of the campaign will be to prevent elections, due before June 1966, which the Communists feel they have no chance of winning.

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In an informal news conference from the rebel zone on 29 September, Juan Bosch again lashed out against the US. He claimed that all evil in the country "stems from April 28, when the Americans first landed" and that rather than elections "there will be catastrophe." Even Bosch's partisans are reportedly distressed now over his attitude and behavior. His bitter obsession with the issue of intervention apparently prevents him from concentrating for long on anything else.

A fight to control the University of Santo Domingo appears to be shaping up for the scheduled meeting of its governing body on 2 October. The heavily Communist-influenced insurgent administration now holds possession of the campus and has continued to staff university positions. Patria, the Communist newspaper, has reported that former rebel foreign minister Jottin Cury has been appointed dean of the law school. Both factions claim the support of Garcia Godoy.

(continued)

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The early withdrawal of the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) was strongly demanded by Santiago's independent daily newspaper La Informacion on 28 September. This was the first such call in non-rebel media since the provisional government was installed.

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NOTES

Congo (Leopoldville): Premier Tshombé has won his first test of strength since Parliament convened last week through the election of members of his Conaco party to the two top positions in the Chamber of Deputies. However, the votes they attracted, 85 and 89 in the 166-seat house, fell far short of the 112 seats Conaco and its allies won in the Parliament elections last March. Even Tshombé's present slender margin is subject to abrupt change in view of the volatility of Congolese politics.

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Israel-Jordan: Israel may soon mount another retaliatory raid against terrorist bases in Jordan. An encounter on the night of 29-30 September between an Israeli patrol and infiltrating saboteurs near the Jordanian border was the eleventh such incident since the latest Israeli reprisal on 5 September. The Jordanian Government is trying to prevent incursions into Israel by the Syrian-supported "Fatah" terrorist organization, but Israel, which believes the group is responsible for at least five of the recent incidents, is dissatisfied with Amman's performance.

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USSR: Remarks by party chief Brezhnev to the central committee plenum yesterday confirm that, because of the poor harvest, state procurement of grain this year will fall below the planned goal. Brezhnev indicated, however, "that everything necessary" has been done to ensure the normal supply of bread products. His remarks pointed out that, in general, the food situation should be relatively favorable because other crops are satisfactory and animal husbandry good. The USSR is believed to have filled most, if not all, of its grain deficit with the purchase since 1 July of more than 7 million tons of wheat and flour from Canada, Argentina, and France.

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Panama: Former president Arnulfo Arias' strong attacks on the joint canal statement of 24 September have prompted Foreign Minister Eleta to counter with a radio and television campaign to discredit Arias and his mass-based Panamenista Party. Although the heat of this exchange may increase the chances of street demonstrations or an inflammatory incident in the National Assembly which opens today, Eleta feels the risk is warranted. Ambassador Adair comments that Eleta appears to be more concerned than most Panamanian officials but notes that the growth of Arias' campaign could do "great damage" to the treaty negotiations and to Panama-US relations in general.

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THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

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